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Recent Developments
in Health Law
Harvard Law & Health Care Society
Human Stem Cell Research: NIH Releases Draft Guidelines for Comment
In December 1998, two groups of sci-
entists announced that they had suc-
cessfully isolated and cultured human
pluripotent stem cells. This news was
greeted with both tremendous enthu-
siasm and concern. Because these cells
can develop into most types of cells or
tissues in the human body, they hold
great promise for scientific research
and medical advances. For example,
stem cells can potentially be used to:
• Generate cells and tissues for
transplantation and therapy for
conditions such as Parkinson's
disease, spinal cord injury, stroke,
burns, heart disease, diabetes,
and arthritis;
- Improve scientists' under-
standing of the complex events
that occur during normal human
development, as well as the ab-
normal events which cause con-
ditions such as birth defects and
cancer; and
• Substantially change the devel-
opment and testing of drugs.
New medications could be tested
initially on stem cells, and only
drugs which were safe and effec-
tive on the cells would be tested
further on laboratory animals
and humans.
At the same time, the advent of
laboratory-ready human pluripotent
stem cells provokes pressing legal and
ethical concerns. The derivation of
stem cells from human embryos and
fetal tissue raises legal issues in light of
the federal ban on human embryo re-
search and federal regulations on fetal
tissue research. There is also consider-
able ethical disagreement on the appro-
priate level of respect for human em-
bryos and fetal tissue as sources of stem
cells. Finally, some fear that stem cell
research sits at the brink of a slippery
slope that may lead to human cloning
practices.
In January 1999, the General
Counsel of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) deter-
mined that federal law does not pro-
hibit public funding of pluripotent stem
cell research. Although federal law
bans HHS' funding of research in
which human embryos are created for
research purposes or are destroyed or
subjected to greater than minimal risk
(PL. 105-277, section 511,112 STAT.
2681-386), the ban does not apply to
research with stem cells obtained from
human embryos. The legal opinion
also specified that stem cells derived
from fetal tissue can be used for re-
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search, but since these stem cells fall
within the legal definition of human
fetal tissue, the research must comply
with federal regulations on fetal tissue
research (42 U.S.C. 289g-2(a), 45 CFR
§ 46.210, 42 U.S.C. 289g-1).
Following HHS' legal clearance,
the NIH Director, Harold Varmus,
convened a 13-member working group
to draw up guidelines for the proper
conduct of research involving human
pluripotent stem cells. The group com-
prises representatives from a broad
range of interest groups, including sci-
entists, ethicists, lawyers, clinicians,
patients and patient advocates. The
working group held a public meeting
in April 1999 to discuss the guidelines
and hear commentary from various
parties, including the American Soci-
ety of Cell Biology, National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, Alliance for
Aging Research, House Pro-Life Cau-
cus, and National Bioethics Advisory
Commission.
On December 2, 1999, the NIH
released the working group's draft of
the Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Re-
search Guidelines. 64 Fed. Reg. 67576
(December 1999). The NIH has solic-
ited feedback on the draft guidelines
and recently extended the comment
period until February 22, 2000. Thou-
sands of comments had been submit-
ted as of mid-January. The working
group will carefully consider the com-
ments and make revisions to the guide-
lines. Until the final guidelines are
adopted, all publicly-funded research
involving pluripotent stem cells is on
hold. An NIH official has indicated
that the final guidelines would prob-
ably not be ready until early summer.
The draft guidelines
The draft guidelines cover any appli-
cations or proposals for federal re-
search funding involving human pluri-
potent stem cells. See generally Fact
Sheet on Human Pluripotent Stem Cell
Research Guidelines (Dec. 1, 1999)
<http://www.nih.gov/ news/stemcell/
factsheet.html>. The guidelines do not
apply to privately funded research on
human pluripotent stem cells, though
the National Bioethics Advisory Com-
mission (NBAC) strongly encourages
private researchers to voluntarily com-
ply with similar guidelines.
According to the guidelines, scien-
tific investigators must demonstrate the
following to qualify for federal funds:
-If the stem cells originate from
human embryos, the embryos
must have been excess embryos
created for the purposes of in-
fertility treatment, not expressly
for research. The investigator
must not be involved in the in-
fertility treatment, play any role
in the donor's decision to donate
the embryos, or offer monetary
or any other incentive to donate
the embryos.
-If the human pluripotent stem
cells originate from fetal tissue,
the research must be in compli-
ance with all laws and regulations
governing human fetal tissue re-
search and the fetal tissue trans-
plantation research statute.
-Excess embryos and fetal tissue
must be obtained with the
donor's informed consent. Sev-
eral requirements for informed
consent are specified, including
provisions that donors will not
receive any information regard-
ing the subsequent testing on the
fetal tissue or cells, that all iden-
tifiers will be removed from the
cells, and that donors will not
receive any financial reward from
the research on the cells.
To ensure compliance and moni-
tor the development of research prac-
tices, the guidelines establish the Hu-
man Pluripotent Stem Cell Review
Group (HPSCRG or "Review
Group"). The Review Group would
conduct an additional review of any
research proposal involving pluripo-
tent stem cells after the proposal has
been approved by an institutional re-
view board and NIH peer review
group. If a proposal involves a newly-
derived line of stem cells, the Review
Group would hold a public review
meeting. The Review Group would
also be responsible for assembling an
annual report on the number of pro-
posals reviewed and the titles of all
awarded applications, supplements or
administrative approvals for the use of
existing funds and intramural projects.
Finally, the guidelines expressly
forbid certain practices with federal
funds, including the creation of stem
cells expressly for research purposes
and the addition of stem cells to hu-
man or animal eggs or embryos via
somatic cell nuclear transfer. The pro-
hibition on somatic cell nuclear trans-
fer reflects concern that this technique
could be used for human cloning pur-
poses.
Reaction to the guidelines
Response to these draft guidelines has
been mixed and vehement. The Pa-
tients' Coalition for Urgent Research
hails the guidelines as a step toward "a
new area of science with tremendous
promise for alleviating and even cur-
ing catastrophic illness," perhaps for
more than 100 million patients nation-
wide. Similarly, Rep. Nina Lowey (D-
NY) views this research as offering
Americans "the promise of better treat-
ment and perhaps even cures for dis-
eases like cancer, Parkinson's,
Alzheimer's and diabetes."
On the other hand, many mem-
bers of Congress object to federal fund-
ing of stem cell research because the
cells originate from the death of a hu-
man embryo. Rep. Christopher Smith
(R-NJ), a leading opponent of stem cell
research, called the new guidelines "a
sham... [t]hey attempt to give a glow
of respectability to truly barbaric and
grotesque experiments on human be-
ings." The National Right to Life Com-
mittee, like many anti-abortion groups,
argues that the guidelines "would re-
sult in federal sponsorship and fund-
ing of experiments in which living hu-
man embryos are dissected and killed
- a clear violation of federal law .... "I
The scientific community has gen-
erally praised the draft guidelines.
University of California at San Fran-
cisco researcher Roger Pedersen calls
the guidelines "a positive thing, a very
thoughtful and thorough response" to
a delicate political situation. Some sci-
entists advocate a less cumbersome sys-
tem of regulation. For example, Paul
Berg, Ph.D., a Stanford University pro-
fessor and Chair of the American So-
ciety of Cell Biology Public Policy
Committee, feels that federally-funded
investigators should not be held re-
sponsible for monitoring stem cell deri-
vation procedures when private indus-
try is the source of the cells. 2 Similarly,
the Federation of American Societies
for Experimental Biology (FASEB)
President David Kaufman, M.D.,
Ph.D., belives that independent certi-
fication of derivation and consent pro-
tocols by each investigator would cause
"an unnecessary duplication of effort."
Kaufman suggests instead the establish-
ment of a certification process for stem
cell lines, with publication of the cell
lines that are acceptable for use. FASEB
also recommends that research using
stem cells derived before the publica-
tion of the draft guidelines should be
eligible for federal funding, even
though the currently available stem cell
lines do not meet the criteria set forth
in the draft guidelines.3
Recent and upcoming events
Stem cell research will soon enter the
political spotlight.4 On January 31,
2000, Senate Appropriations/HHS
Subcommittee Chair Arlen Specter (R-
PA) and Ranking Minority Member
Tom Harkin (D-IA) introduced Bill
S2015 which would allow for federal
funding of stem cell derivation as well
as research. (Under NIH draft guide-
lines, investigators cannot use federal
funds to derive the stem cells; instead,
they must obtain them from private
sources such as in-vitro fertilization
[IVF] clinics.) The Specter/Harkin
measure would also enable institutional
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review boards to determine whether
stem cell research proposals conform
with NIH guidelines and would require
the HHS Secretary to submit an an-
nual report to Congress on stem cell
research funded under the legislation.
Like the NIH guidelines, the bill pro-
hibits the federally-funded creation of
human embryos or clones, and forbids
the transfer or acquisition of embryos
via monetary transactions. On Febru-
ary 22, the Subcommittee plans to hold
a hearing on stem cell research which
will include testimony from science and
disease research advocacy groups, as
well as celebrities Christopher Reeve
and Michael J. Fox. On March 8, the
subcommittee is scheduled to discuss
the President's FY 2001 budget for the
NIH March 8. In the House, expected
hearings on embryo or fetal research
issues include a Commerce/Health Sub-
committee hearing on Representative
Tom Tancredo's (R-CO.) H. Res. 350,
a resolution to prevent the trafficking
of aborted fetal tissue and body parts
for profit and a Science Committee
hearing on cloning research.
Another important recent devel-
opment was the February 1, 2000 an-
nouncement of the University of
Wisconsin's intent to distribute its line
of human pluripotent stem cells. Uni-
versity of Wisconsin researcher James
Thomson generated one of the two
current lines of stem cells with the
sponsorship of the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (WARF) and
Geron Corporation. Starting in late
spring, WiCell, a non-profit research
institute established by.WARF, plans to
distribute the stem cells developed by
Thomson. According to WiCell, sci-
entists interested in obtaining the cells
would submit a confidential summary
of research plans to WiCell which
would review the plans for appropri-
ate use and adequate respect for the
stem cells (e.g., cloning research would
be prohibited). Academic researchers
would be able to obtain two vials of
the stem cells for $500, though if re-
searchers subsequently wished to com-
mercialize any of their findings, they
would have to negotiate with WiCell
and potentially Geron. Industry re-
searchers, on the other hand, would
have to pay significant up-front fees for
the cells and provide royalties to WiCell
and/or Geron for any revenue realized
from the cells. WiCell's plan has been
praised by scientists as "an excellent
idea to share these cells."'
The next few months will be an
important and interesting time for hu-
man pluripotent stem cell research.
Many events, including the promulga-
tion of the final NIH guidelines and
developments in Congress, are likely
to have a pivotal role in determining
the course of regulation for this cru-
cial area of scientific research.
Susan Lee
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ERISA and RICO: New
Tools for HMO
Litigators
Fiduciary duty under ERISA
As the shield preempting state suits
under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) has been
successfully pierced (see California Div.
Of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr. N.A. Inc., 519 U.S.
316 (1997) and Duke v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir.
1995)), plaintiff attorneys have begun
to use the ERISA statute itself to fur-
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ther litigation against managed care
organizations. The court in Shea v.
Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997),
held in a landmark decision that an
HMO's failure to disclose financial in-
centives that discourage a treating phy-
sician from providing essential health
care referrals for conditions covered
under the plan benefit structure is a
breach of ERISAs fiduciary duties. The
pertinent ERISA provision requires
that plan fiduciaries "discharge [their]
duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and ben-
eficiaries." See 29 U.S.C. 5 1104(a)(1)
(1999). In Shea, the primary care phy-
sician, disregarding Mr. Shea's exten-
sive family history of heart disease and
classic symptoms of a heart condition,
assured the patient that it was not nec-
essary for him to see a cardiologist.
Subsequent to his death from a heart
attack a few months later, Mr. Shea's
wife successfully argued that had her
husband known that the primary care
physician would be penalized for too
many specialist referrals or receive a
bonus for reducing specialized care, he
would have disregarded his physician's
advice and obtained a cardiologist's
advice at his own expense. The court
therefore found it imperative to impose
a duty upon the HMO to disclose fi-
nancial arrangements between man-
aged care organizations and their con-
tracting physicians.
Questioning the duty to disclose
financial incentives
The court in Weiss v. CIGNA
Healthcare, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 748
(S.D.N.Y 1997), declined to follow the
Shea approach, holding that the
physician's ethical breach in taking
advantage of financial incentives by
withholding necessary care is not at-
tributable to the health plan. Alterna-
tively, the court in Ehlmann v. Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan of Texas, 198
F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000) did not ex-
plicitly rebut Shea, but instead refined
it. Ehlmann held that without a spe-
cific inquiry by a plan beneficiary, or
some other special circumstance, a
health plan has no duty to disclose
material information about physician
compensation arrangements. Unlike
Mr. Shea's specific inquiry into seeing
a cardiologist, Mr. Ehlmann sought an
injunction requiring a general disclo-
sure to all plan members regarding the
bonus arrangement between the
HMOs and their contracting physi-
cians. The Ehlmann court declined to
decide whether ERISA imposed such
a fiduciary duty of material disclosure
at all, but they did indicate in dicta
where they might stand on the issue.
Invoking the canon of statutory con-
struction that the specific language in
a statute rules the general, the court
pointed out that while no reference is
made to any disclosure duty for physi-
cian reimbursement plans, ERISA con-
tains many other provisions detailing
HMOs' disclosure duties. See 29
U.S.C. SS 1021-1031. Although, as the
plaintiff argued, at the time Congress
drafted ERISA, the same incentives to
cut back on healthcare expenses were
not present, the court indicated that
expanding these disclosure duties
would exceed their judicial role. They
explained, "Congress and the Depart-
ment of Labor are surely aware of these
changes and have chosen not to supple-
ment ERISA's disclosure require-
ments." Id at 556.
The Supreme Court to decide if
the existence of a financial
incentive structure implies a
fiduciary duty under ERISA
After the denial of a petition for re-
hearing by the Seventh Circuit en banc
of Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362
(7th Cir. 1998) to review reversal of a
dismissed ERISA claim, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and oral ar-
guments were scheduled for February
23, 2000. Herdrich held that financial
incentives for physicians to limit medi-
cal treatment could reach the level of a
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
where the fiduciary trust between plan
beneficiaries and fiduciaries no longer
exists. This fiduciary trust would no
longer exist in a situation where "phy-
sicians delay providing necessary treat-
ment to, or withhold administering
proper care to, plan beneficiaries for
the sole purpose of increasing their
bonuses." Id at 373. In this case, al-
though Mrs. Herdrich's appendix was
noticeably inflamed, her physician put
off for eight days the necessary diag-
nostic procedure. During the delay her
appendix ruptured resulting in perito-
nitis. The court emphasizes that the
dual loyalties tolerated under ERISA
do not extend to such situations where
a plan fiduciary "jettisons his respon-
sibility to the physical well-being of
beneficiaries in favor of 'loyalty' to his
own financial interests." Id at 373.
The dissent in Herdrich argued
that the court's role in ensuring that
financial incentives offered by a health
plan to physicians were implemented
in compliance with the ERISA fiduciary
duties did not arise until the market
failed to align interests. Because em-
ployers have the bargaining power to
choose a different health plan if one
consistently fails to honor valid claims,
paying meritorious claims is in the
insurer's best interest, and no conflict
of interest thus exists. The dissent
would follow the rule laid down in
Shea to enable the market to function
by supplying the information employ-
ers need to evaluate their choice of
health plans, including disclosure of
any financial incentives to limit care.
The dissent from the denial of the re-
hearing en banc, joined by Chief Judge
Posner, expressed the view that the
majority's holding put all HMOs at risk
of being sued for breach of ERISA fi-
duciary duties "because the allegations
in the complaint narrate mundane fea-
tures" of HMOs such as limiting refer-
rals to specialists, using capitated fee
systems with bonus provisions, and
limiting the provision of care to spe-
cific locations. See Herdrich v. Pegram,
170 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 1999).
RICO: The ability to bring
federal claims against insurance
companies tested
In Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 119 S. Ct.
710 (1999), a class of health insurance
co-payors alleged a violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) claiming that
Humana failed to disclose or pass on
discounts negotiated with providers so
that the Humana plan members paid
significantly more than the contracted
20% co-payment. See 18 U.S.C. 5
1964 (1984). To make a claim under
RICO, a statute originally designed to
allow prosecution of organized crime,
the plaintiff must show both conduct
of an "enterprise" through a pattern
of racketeering activity and injury to
the plaintiff, his business, or his prop-
erty. Id. Forsyth claimed a pattern of
racketeering activity consisting of mail,
wire, radio, and television fraud and
damages resulting from paying a de
facto higher percentage of the co-pay-
ment than was bargained for. The Su-
preme Court unanimously ruled that
RICO, which prohibits the same con-
duct as Nevada insurance law, but pro-
vides more extensive remedies includ-
ing treble damages, does not "invali-
date, impair or supersede" the state's
laws and so is not precluded under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. See 15
U.S.C.A. 5 1012(b) (1997). After the
motion for summary judgment was
denied, this class action suit settled. If
the court approves the settlement, the
co-payor and premium class members
will receive $11,986,200 and
$4,113,800 respectively. See SE34 ALI-
ABA 505, 522.
In another test of the use of RICO
against managed care plans, Maio v
Aetna Inc., 1999 WL 800315 (E.D.Pa.)
was filed alleging that Aetna's "adver-
tising and marketing materials falsely
represent that it is committed to main-
taining and improving quality of care
when in fact, Aetna failed to disclose
that its internal policies and agreements
with its providers are driven by fiscal
and administrative considerations that
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reduce the quality of healthcare ser-
vices." See SE34 ALI-ABA 505, 523-
524. This claim was dismissed with
prejudice for lack of standing because
the allegation that quality of care might
suffer in the future was too hypotheti-
cal to carry the burden of showing an
injury in fact. In a blow to the useful-
ness of RICO for future HMO litiga-
tion, the court went on in dicta to say
that other fatal defects were present in
the plaintiff's complaint. For example,
the court speculated that advertise-
ments asserting commitment to qual-
ity of care could not constitute a
fraudulent inducement, but rather were
mere puffery. They also thought that
the plaintiffs failed to plead a sufficient
RICO "enterprise," and, furthermore,
should direct their dissatisfaction at
legislatures and regulatory agencies
rather than the courts.
Conclusion
At this point, ERISA is a more firmly
established means of bringing suit
against the managed care industry than
is RICO. However, the future of suits
brought under either statute is in limbo.
The Supreme Court's treatment of Pe-
gram this term will resolve the conflict-
ing lower court opinions and clear up
the fiduciary duties implicated by
ERISA in the administration of finan-
cial incentive structures. Upcoming dis-
positions of several recently filed RICO
complaints will more broadly illustrate
the treatment to be expected in the
future of RICO claims than the single
decision by one federal district court
judge thus far. In the meantime, the fil-
ing of claims against managed care
plans under both ERISA and RICO
continue. See Conte v. Aetna-U.S.
Healthcare Inc., E.D. Pa., No. 99-CV-
4929, complaint filed 10/4/99, Price v.
Humana Inc., S.D. Fla., No. 99-8763,
complaint filed 10/4/99, and O'Neil v.
Aetna Inc., S.D. Miss., No.
2:99CV284PG, complaint filed 10/7/
99.
Elaine T Moore
Legal Implications of
Discrimination in Medi-
cal Practice
Recent medical studies have indicated
that medical professionals discriminate
in their treatment practices on the ba-
sis of race and gender. Among the
many concerns stemming from this
realization are questions about the pos-
sibility of legal actions and the avail-
ability ofl individual compensation for
the denial of equal care. By meeting
legal evidentiary standards,1 the recent
statistical data pointing to discrimina-
tory trends have created the potential
for legal recourse through Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act2 which prohibits
recipients of federal funding from treat-
ing people differently on the basis of
race or national origin. Nevertheless,
it remains unclear whether patients
who have been treated unequally will
be able to use these studies as a basis
for successful legal action.
Over the past year, the New En-
gland Journal of Medicine has pub-
lished several studies showing dispari-
ties in referrals and treatment of
women and minorities.3 The first, pub-
lished in February 1999 and referred
to here as the Schulman study, initiated
the debate.4 Researchers videotaped
eight actors portraying various pairs of
paitents: male and female, African-
American and Caucasian, young and
old. The study varied six experimen-
tal factors among the 144 personali-
ties it created for the videotapes: race,
sex, age, level of coronary risk, type of
chest pain, and the results of a stress
test. A total of 720 physicians each
viewed one of these 144 videotapes
and was asked to answer a number of
questions about how to treat the pa-
tient. The Schulman study indicated
that there were statistically significant
differences in the rate of referral for
cardiac catheterization between gen-
ders and races even after accounting
for any physiological differences be-
tween men and women and between
Caucasians and minorities. Despite
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articles questioning Schulman's statis-
tical conclusions,' other recent studies
have indicated racial discrepancies in
access to renal transplantation,6 treat-
ment of early-stage lung cancer,7 and
success of treatment of left ventricular
dysfunction.' However, it is important
to note that the latter two studies were
explicit about not concluding why
these disparities occured. They noted
various factors which could cause such
differing results, even without any form
of physician discrimination. 9
An analysis of racial discrimination
illustrates the legal questions involved
in these cases. Patients who find they
have been discriminated against may
use these studies as evidence that mi-
norities are treated differently by doc-
tors, thereby creating a potential for
legal recourse. However, a private
plaintiff's recourse will likely only take
the form of prospective, injunctive or
declaratory relief. This means that a
court would order the institution to
undo the discrimination, if possible, or
refrain from discriminating against the
plaintiffs in the future. Title VI of the
Civil Rights Acts provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation
in, denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance."10 The Office of
Civil Rights (OCR), located in the De-
partment of Health and Human Ser-
vices, is responsible for enforcing the
federal civil rights laws in hospitals,
clinics, social service centers and related
agencies." In the past, courts have held
that Medicare and Medicaid are "fed-
eral financial assistance" under the stat-
ute, and therefore hospitals and their
physicians must comply with the stat-
ute in order to keep their funding. 12
Moreover, the prohibition against dis-
crimination applies to the hospital pro-
gram as a whole, as a recipient of the
funding, not to the individual patient
beneficiaries of Medicare or Medicaid.
Any patient-whether or not a Medi-
care or Medicaid beneficiary-will
have a cause of action against a medi-
cal establishment that discriminates, as
long as the program 3 in which they
are involved does participate in Medi-
care or Medicaid.'
4
The Office of Civil Rights has pro-
mulgated regulations under Title VI
which outlaw both intentionally dis-
criminatory acts as well as programs
and activities that have a racially dis-
parate impact.'5 A recipient of federal
funds may not "utilize criteria or meth-
ods of administration which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race, color
or national origin, or have the effect
of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the
program as respect individuals of a
particular race, color, or national ori-
gin.' 6 Moreover, "[i]n administering
a program regarding which the recipi-
ent has previously discriminated
against persons on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, the recipient
must take affirmative action to over-
come the effects of prior discrimina-
tion."' 7
In Guardians Association v. Civil
Service Commission of New York" the
Supreme Court held that in order to
violate the Title VI statute itself a de-
fendant must have intended to dis-
criminate. However, a majority of jus-
tices stated that agency regulations pro-
mulgated under Title VI may incorpo-
rate a lower, disparate-impact standard.
Therefore, discriminatory effect, with-
out discriminatory intent is enough to
violate the regulations. Two years later
in Alexander v. Choate, a unanimous
Supreme Court explained the Guard-
ians Association holding by saying that
"[i]n essence, then, we held that Title
VI had delegated to the agencies in the
first instance the complex determina-
tion of what sorts of disparate impacts
upon minorities constituted sufficiently
significant social problems, and were
readily enough remediable, to warrant
altering the practices of the federal
grantees that had produced those im-
pacts."' 9 Therefore the OCR regula-
tions can rightfully prohibit disparate
impact discrimination.
Although it is clear that the stat-
ute and regulations cover intentional
and disparate impact cases, it is not
equally clear that private plaintiffs can
sue to enforce the OCR regulations.
The Office of Civil Rights itself can
bring enforcement actions requiring
medical centers to comply with their
regulations. However, in order for in-
jured patients to sue there must be a
private right of action. In Guardians
Association, five justices endorsed with-
out holding the existence of a private
right of action for discriminatory ef-
fects regulations cases. 20 This suggests
that injured plaintiffs may be able to
bring lawsuits if their medical institu-
tions have unintentionally or intention-
ally discriminated against them. An
important question in the determina-
tion of whether the regulations imply
this right, is whether the Title VI stat-
ute itself implies a private right of ac-
tion. If it does, then a regulation within
its scope will also imply a private right
of action.2 1 The Supreme Court in
Guardians Association said that Title
VI itself gives rise to a right of action,
at least for claims for injunctive relief.
However, the Court has already estab-
lished that regulations can be broader
than the Title VI statute itself, by cov-
ering disparate impact scenarios.
Therefore, the question remains
whether there is an implied right of
action for those parts of the regulations
not within Title VI's actual ambit. Both
the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit have analyzed this question in
depth and have held that there is an
implied right of action for regulations
promulgated under Title VI, even
though these regulations, by reaching
disparate impact, are broader than the
statute itself.23 Therefore, the courts
at this point seem favorable to the pos-
sibility of injured patients suing to en-
force the OCR regulations which pro-
scribe disparate treatment in medical
facilities.
Even if patients will be able to es-
tablish discrimination suits under the
OCR regulations covering medical cen-
ters, it is less clear what remedies will
be available to these plaintiffs. The
possibility of a compensatory damages
remedy for such a violation is question-
able after Guardians Association. The
Guardians Court made it clear that
compensatory relief is not available, at
least unless discriminatory intent has
been proven. 24 One explanation for
this limitation is derived from the fact
that Congressional authority to create
Title VI came from its Spending Clause
power.2s When legislating through this
power, the government effectively pro-
poses a contract with the states: if a
state accepts a specific form of federal
funding, it must follow certain regula-
tions, like the prohibitions on discrimi-
nation. The Supreme Court in
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,26
held that under Spending Clause stat-
utes, courts cannot award relief other
than that contemplated by the statute;
otherwise they would be adding bur-
dens to the states that were not there
at the time the contract was made.27
Supreme Court precedent has estab-
lished that the legislative history shows
that Congress did not intend to include
a damages remedy for non-intentional
violations.2" In addition, private plain-
tiffs can not sue to have an institution's
funding withdrawn for violation of the
statute. Only the overseeing federal
agency may act to withdraw the fund-
ing. Therefore, absent intentional vio-
lation, a plaintiff's remedies may only
be prospective relief, such as an injunc-
tion requiring compliance with the stat-
ute and regulations.
In considering these issues, it is
critical to distinguish between inten-
tional discrimination and unintentional
discriminatory effects: at what point
does a discriminatory practice become
intentional? Given these recent stud-
ies, the medical community will have
a more difficult time in the future ar-
guing that they were not aware that
such violations were occurring. For
example, these recent studies may not
be evidence that individual doctors are
intentionally treating minorities and
women differently, but they can still be
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used to show that medical institutions
were aware of the problem. That may
be sufficient to prove intentionality if
nothing is done to correct the practice.
A deliberate indifference standard of
intentionality has been accepted in par-
allel Title IX 21 cases where the Supreme
Court has held that knowledge of
sexual harassment can be violative of
Title IX if the harassment is not cor-
rected.30 Moreover, the OCR regula-
tions themselves seem to prohibit de-
liberate indifference,31 suggesting that
such behavior may be sufficient to sup-
port an intentional discrimination
claim. This interpretation is favorable
to plaintiffs since the Supreme Court
has suggested that compensatory dam-
ages may be available in those circum-
stances.
Over the past decade, our coun-
try has focused on tackling the issues
of gender and race discrimination both
legally and culturally. The recent stud-
ies above have brought significant me-
dia and congressional attention to this
highly relevant strand of the issue: dis-
crimination in health care.3" Whether
or not most of these occurrences are
blatantly intentional, that inquiry seems
irrelevant to anyone who has been in-
jured by these practices. So long as
relief is only prospective, the legal ma-
chinery will not likely cause a social
reconstruction: plaintiffs will have little
incentive to bring the legal action
which would undoubtedly force medi-
cal institutions to face this problem
head on. An injunction preventing fu-
ture discrimination is little consolation
to a patient was not referred for car-
diac catheterization in time, or was not
informed about renal transplantation
options. Whether discrepancies exist
because physicians tend to have differ-
ent non-scientific expectations for
women and minorities, or because
communication between people is af-
fected by race and gender,33 or for some
presently undiscovered reason, sub-
optimal health care without physiologi-
cal basis is not acceptable. Further
study into the reasons for inconsistent
handling of medical situations is nec-
essary to provide mechanisms for im-
proving health care quality.34 Medical
professionals must scrutinize their in-
dividual behavior to determine if and
when they are letting sociological bi-
ases and expectations invade hospital
rooms and dictate their patients' fu-
tures.
Jessamyn S. Berniker
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Wrongful Death: Okla-
homa Supreme Court
Replaces Viability Stan-
dard with "Live Birth"
Standard
On December 7, 1999, a divided Okla-
homa Supreme Court held in Nealis v.
Baird1 that a claim may be brought
under Oklahoma's wrongful death stat-
ute2 on behalf of a nonviable fetus born
alive. The decision represents a depar-
ture from the traditional notion that
"viability"-the ability of a fetus to
sustain life outside the womb with or
without medical assistance-is the stan-
dard for wrongful death recovery. In
replacing the "viability" standard with
a "live birth" standard, the majority
maintained that live birth is the "unas-
sailable point at which legal rights must
be said to attach to the human per-
son."3 By holding a nonviable fetus a
legal "person" for the purpose of a
wrongful death claim, the court's de-
cision emphasizes the limited applica-
tion of the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Roe v. Wade4 that a
fetus is not a person for the purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Case history
Sheila Nealis had her first and only
appointment with Dr. Baird, an Okla-
homa Board-certified family physician,
on August 28, 1991. Later that night,
she discharged fluid and blood. When
Mrs. Nealis returned to the clinic in
the morning, she was examined by Dr.
Hartwig who diagnosed her as threat-
ening miscarriage and ordered an ul-
trasound. The ultrasound showed no
abnormalities. Mrs. Nealis continued
to bleed and experience intermittent
cramping but did not return to the
clinic. One month later, Mrs. Nealis
presented herself to the Perry Memo-
rial Hospital (PMH) emergency room
where she was seen by Dr. Hartwig,
who again diagnosed her condition as
threatening miscarriage. Another ul-
trasound indicated a possible placen-
tal abruption. After Mrs. Nealis missed
two follow-up appointments, Drs.
Hartwig and Baird sent her a certified
letter discharging her from their care.
On November 25, Mrs. Nealis was
treated for premature labor by Dr.
Knecht, the on-call physician in the
PMH emergency room. A third ultra-
sound confirmed a placental abruption
and established the age of the fetus as
20-21 weeks. Dr. Knecht then pre-
scribed Demerol to induce labor, de-
spite its effect of suppressing respira-
tion in newborns. At birth, although
nurses testified to gasping noises, mea-
surements of the baby's functions were
zero and Dr. Knecht recorded a still
birth.
Mr. and Mrs. Nealis pressed two
claims in a medical malpractice action.
First, they sought damages for personal
injuries resulting from the prenatal care
provided to Mrs. Nealis by Drs. Baird
and Hartwig. Second, they sought re-
covery from Drs. Baird, Hartwig and
Knecht for the wrongful death of their
prematurely born child. The jury
found for the defendants on both
claims and the appellate court affirmed.
Nealis v. Baird
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court
affirmed the jury verdict exonerating
Drs. Baird and Hartwig on the first
claim and Dr. Knecht on the second
claim, it reversed the judgment exon-
erating Drs. Baird and Hartwig on the
second, wrongful death claim. The
court's reversal rested on an errone-
ous jury instruction that the fetus must
have been viable at the time of birth
for liability to attach.
Oklahoma's wrongful death stat-
ute applies to a "person" who could
have brought actions for personal in-
jury "had he lived." In interpreting the
language of this statute, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court "reject(ed) the notion
that the distinction between biological
existence and personhood can extend
beyond live birth," holding instead that
"once live birth occurs, the debate over
whether the fetus is or is not a person
ends."5 The court held that the phrase
"had he lived" could apply to a nonvi-
able fetus because "Contemporary sci-
entific precepts accept as a given that
human life begins at conception." 6
In Nealis, the defendant doctors
argued that taken together, Evans v.
Olson7 and Guyer v. Hugo Publishing
Co.8 indicate no cause of action for the
wrongful death of a nonviable fetus
under any circumstances. In Evans, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
surviving child could bring a common
law personal injury action for prenatal
injury and, if the prenatal injury re-
sulted in the death of a viable child in
the mother's womb, the child's repre-
sentatives could bring an action under
the wrongful death statute. In Guyer,
the Court of Civil Appeals held that
Oklahoma did not recognize a wrong-
ful death action for the loss of a nonvi-
able stillborn fetus. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, however, disagreed
with the doctors, maintaining that
Evans and Guyer did not govern the
Nealis case since they both involved a
fetus not born alive.
At the same time, however, the
court found overbroad the Nealis' in-
terpretation of its decision in Graham
v. Keuchel,9 which held that a wrong-
ful death action in Oklahoma can be
predicated upon a prenatal injury that
occurs prior to viability. Mr. and Mrs.
Nealis urged that Graham removed
viability as a consideration in wrong-
ful death actions if the decedent is born
alive at any time during gestation. The
court rejected this argument because
the question of the child's viability at
the time of its birth and death was not
an issue in Graham, as the child in that
case was born alive after a full-term
pregnancy. In Graham, the court sim-
ply denied the necessity of showing
viability at the time of the tortious act
causing the injury. Thus, Graham did
not answer the question of whether a
wrongful death action will lie for the
death of a nonviable fetus born alive.
In most jurisdictions, if a child is
stillborn but survived an injury in utero
to reach the point of viability, a wrong-
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ful death action may be maintained.
However, where the child is born alive
prior to attaining viability, decisions
conflict about whether a wrongful
death action is similarly permissible.
The reasons courts have put forth
against permitting the action include
lack of precedent, difficulty of proof,
fear of fictitious claims, the necessity
of legislative action authorizing such
actions, and the traditional notion that
the fetus is not a person prior to viabil-
ity. These reasons were rejected by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Nealis.
While the court conceded that "prece-
dent is sketchy,"' 10 it discerned no
greater problem regarding matters of
proof or fictitious claims than exist in
any other tort case. Furthermore, the
court argued that the state legislature,
by tying the state's wrongful death stat-
ute to the common-law action for dam-
ages for personal injury, left the reach
of the wrongful death statute to the
growth of the common law.
Implications for abortions
The Oklahoma Supreme Court paid
special attention to the potential ob-
jection to their decision in Nealis based
on Roe v. Wade." After noting that
nothing in Roe prohibits the states from
affording legal protection to fetuses
born alive, the court argued that Roe's
conclusion that a fetus is not a person
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution
does not require that it be considered
so for every other purpose: Roe v. Wade
and its progeny "proscribe(s) the state's
protection of the interests of the fetus
only when (they) conflict with the pri-
vacy-anchored constitutional right...
to an abortion.' 1 2 However, "Where
both the state and the mother have
identical interests in preserving the
child's life and in vindicating harm re-
sulting in its death, Roe poses no legal
obstacle."13
Oklahoma statutes enacted to op-
erate in the context of abortion '4 pre-
sume the viability of an unborn child
over 24 weeks old and mandate the
rendering of reasonable medical care
during the abortion of a viable child.
In Nealis, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court upheld the appellate court's de-
cision that the statute does not apply
to a spontaneous miscarriage or natu-
ral, premature birth. Judge Opala
wrote, "The intent of the legislature in
enacting this statue was to criminalize
certain abortions and not to shift the
burden of producing evidence on the
issues of viability and the appropriate
standard of care in a wrongful action
arising out of spontaneous delivery.""
Instead of viewing the statutes as
setting up an equation between the
rights of an aborted infant and a natu-
rally born infant, as Mr. and Mrs.
Nealis urged, the court perceived the
statutes as setting forth a comparison
in which the right to medical care of a
naturally born infant is used as the
baseline for the medical care afforded
to an aborted infant of similar status.
The court was not persuaded by the
argument that a rejection of their po-
sition gives an aborted child greater
access to medical care than to the
Nealis child because, according to the
ultrasound, he was less than 24 weeks
old, removing any requirement of
medical care under the abortion stat-
ute.
Dissent
Judges Hodges, Struhbar and Johnson
dissented from the majority's decision
to depart from the "viability" standard.
Writing for the dissent, Judge Hodges
argued that, despite a few contrary
decisions, there is general consensus
that a wrongful death action cannot be
maintained for the loss of a nonviable
fetus. He argued that the "live birth"
standard is based on an arbitrary dis-
tinction: whether a nonviable fetus dies
shortly before or shortly after a mis-
carriage. The "viability" standard, on
the other hand, merely recognizes that
a non-viable fetus cannot survive. Al-
though it is possible for a nonviable
infant to show signs of life, such as
heartbeat, breathing and brain-wave,
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the nonviable infant "lacks sufficient
lung tissue to permit survival." 1
6
Furthermore, the dissent claimed
that maintaining the "viability" stan-
dard in wrongful death actions would
be consistent with the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals' adoption of "vi-
ability" as the standard to determine
which fetuses will be afforded protec-
tion under Oklahoma's homicide stat-
ute. "The determination of whether a
defendant wrongfully caused the death
of a fetus should be guided by the
threshold question of 'viability'
whether the cause is civil or criminal,"17
wrote Judge Hodges.
Conclusion
Since the United States Supreme Court
decision of Roe v. Wade, the line of vi-
ability for human fetuses has been con-
sistently pushed back to earlier and
earlier gestational ages. Granting "per-
son" status to a nonviable fetus, even
if only for purposes of the wrongful
death statute, as the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court did in Nealis v. Baird, rep-
resents an important expansion of fe-
tal rights. Although the court explic-
itly limited its decision to nonviable
fetuses born alive, Judge Opala con-
ceded that much of his opinion could
apply equally to stillborn fetuses. The
court's decision in Nealis raises impor-
tant questions about the limits of a
nonviable fetus's rights under the law
and, consequently, the limits of tort li-
ability, particularly for physicians.
Fatma Marouf
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EMTALA: OIG/HCFA
Special Advisory Bulletin
Clarifies EMTALA,
American College of
Emergency Physicians
Criticizes It
In December 1998, the Office of In-
spector General (GIG) and the Health
Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) solicited comments from
health care providers regarding the fed-
eral anti-patient dumping statute, the
Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA) (42 USCA
S1395 dd). EMTALA is a federal health
care law of unprecedented breadth-
the first universal benefit guaranteed
by the federal government. It requires
Medicare-participating hospitals with
public emergency rooms, emergency
physicians, and ancillary surgical and
medical specialists to render adequate
stabilizing treatment to whoever re-
quests it. The 1998 Special Advisory
Bulletin (63 FR 67486-01) sought in-
put on four principal dimensions of
EMTALA: (1) the statutory obligation
to furnish adequate medical screening
to anyone who visits an emergency
room; (2) the responsibilities of health
care providers towards enrollees of
managed care organizations (MCOs);
(3) the prior authorization and pay-
ment rules for Medicare and Medic-
aid; and (4) what practices would pro-
mote hospital compliance with
EMTALA.
Last November, OIG/HCFA pub-
lished another Advisory Bulletin (64 FR
61353-01) which enumerated the sa-
lient issues raised by respondents to the
December 1998 Bulletin and clarified
how EMTALA is to be interpreted in
light of these concerns. The practical
effect of the latter Bulletin is to clarify
for hospitals how to comply with
EMTALA and thereby avoid the legal
remedies OIG/HCFA is empowered to
seek. These remedies include statuto-
rily created penalties such as termina-
tion of Medicare provider agreements,
and civil money damages against both
hospitals and individual physicians.
Also in November 1999, the
American College of Emergency Phy-
sicians (ACEP) released a timely task
force report, Defending America's
Safety Net (available at: <http://
www.acep.org/pdf/safetynet.pdf >).
The report argues that EMTALA has
compromised emergency care across
the nation by mandating that health
care providers render emergency treat-
ment to whoever requests it, regard-
less of his or her ability to pay. ACEP
contends that the federal unfunded
mandate disproportionately affects
rural and inner-city hospitals because
they serve a higher proportion of non-
paying patients and tend to have less
robust operating budgets. Moreover,
ACEP claims that the demands of un-
compensated care drive physicians to
restrict their availability and, hence,
attenuate the already limited resources
of many emergency rooms.
EMTALA Advisory Bulletin
Over 150 health care providers con-
tributed to the OIG/HCFA request for
commentary on EMTALA. The subse-
quent November 1999 Advisory Bul-
letin addressed the respondents' most
prominent concerns: (1) voluntary
withdrawal; (2) inquiries from pro-
spective patients about their ability to
pay for emergency care; (3) dual staff-
ing; (4) prior authorization; and (5) use
of financial responsibility forms. In
addition to delineating these concerns,
the Bulletin set forth guidelines to help
health care providers understand
EMTALA requirements.
Voluntary Withdrawal
According to the Bulletin, hospitals are
not permitted to keep patients waiting
so long that they elect to withdraw
voluntarily and forgo treatment. In the
event of a withdrawal, the hospital
ought to take the following steps: (1)
re-offer the treatment; (2) inform the
patient of the risks of leaving; or (3)
secure the patient's written informed
consent to refuse the treatment. Sig-
nificantly, the burden rests with the
hospital to demonstrate that it has
taken appropriate measures to discour-
age patients from withdrawing.
Inquiries from Patients
And what if patients inquire about fi-
nancial liability prior to treatment? The
Bulletin advises hospitals to defer fur-
ther discussions until after an appro-
priate medical screening. Several com-
mentators to the December 1998 Bul-
letin suggested that this practice may
deter unscreened patients from remain-
ing at the hospital because they will be
uncertain about what costs they may
incur. Nevertheless, the Bulletin main-
tains that hospitals ought to rebuff such
inquiries, placing greater weight on the
goals of screening and stabilization.
Disclosure of relevant financial infor-
mation, however, is appropriate as long
as it does not interfere with expeditious
treatment.
Dual Staffing
An EMTALA-compliant practice has
arisen in which hospitals maintain a
secondary emergency room staff to
treat indigent, uninsured and underin-
sured patients. Though there is con-
cern that this practice results in dispar-
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ate standards of care, the Bulletin con-
tends that there are insufficient data
to support this conclusion. As such,
dual staffing is not an EMTALA viola-
tion per se but may be conducive to
practices or occurrences that do vio-
late the statute such as substandard
medical screening or unreasonably long
waits.
Prior Authorization
A dilemma exists for hospitals: they
are required by law to accept contracts
with MCOs but may violate EMTALA
if they comply with the MCOs's prior
authorization rules. Generally speak-
ing, these rules require MCOs to au-
thorize all but the most routine proce-
dures and absolve them of financial
responsibility if this authorization is not
secured. In worst case scenarios, pa-
tients and hospitals may bear the finan-
cial burdens of unauthorized but nev-
ertheless medically justified emergency
care. Though EMTALA does not con-
fer the authority on OIG/HCFA nec-
essary to resolve this conflict perfectly,
the Bulletin emphasizes that a physi-
cian may contact an MCO for autho-
rization once he or she has rendered
initial stabilizing treatment.
Financial Responsibility Forms
Hospitals often present patients with
Advance Beneficiary Notices or simi-
lar documents, which explain that pa-
tients is liable for the costs of any un-
insured treatment. The Bulletin en-
dorses a "best practice" of deferring
presenting documents until after sta-
bilizing treatment, lest prospective pa-
tients be discouraged from staying. Al-
ternatively, it is permissible under
EMTALA to incorporate financial mat-
ters into a reasonable registration pro-
cess so long as initial treatment is not
unduly delayed.
ACEP's Survey: Defending
America's Safety Net
Coinciding with the EMTALA Bulle-
tin, ACEP published an expansive sur-
vey of the financial health of the
nation's emergency care system, De-
fending America's Safety Net. The re-
port focuses on the frontline provid-
ers of last resort who comprise the most
vital strands of what ACEP calls the
"safety net", and how that net has be-
gun to fray under the weight of copi-
ous EMTALA requirements. Given the
number of uninsured Americans (esti-
mated to be 43 million), compliance
with EMTALA often imposes non-
trivial financial burdens on hospitals
and, ACEP argues, interferes with the
quality of emergency care for those
whom it is meant to serve. In dramatic
language, ACEP characterizes
EMTALA requirements as "a clear and
present danger to the integrity of the
nation's delivery system for emergency
medical care."
Unlike other federal health care
initiatives, EMTALA is an unfunded
mandate. As such, it is responsible for
a preponderance of the uncompen-
sated care provided by physicians and
hospitals. In its report, ACEP estimates
that the direct and indirect costs of
compliance are at least $10 billion, and
may be as high as $27 billion. Since
emergency rooms are the main portal
of entry to the health care system for a
majority of persons without insurance,
a disproportion of these costs fall upon
rural and inner-city providers, where
most of these patients are found. As
the number of uninsured grows, the
requirements of EMTALA may further
jeopardize the financial viability of
these providers.
At the heart of the problem is
emergency department (ED) saturation
in many parts of the country. By this
ACEP means that many EDs are inun-
dated regularly not only with more
patients than they can handle but also
with many patients who cannot pay.
These EDs try to cope by assigning their
physicians to back-up call panels that
can support the on-duty shift. EDs then
confront a difficult choice: either make
uncompensated coverage on these pan-
els a condition of physician employ-
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ment or subsidize care from other bud-
getary sources.
ACEP recommends initiatives
across several frontiers. First, at the
local level, it urges hospitals to affiliate
themselves into cohesive networks to
share more evenly the costs of
EMTALA compliance. At the state
level, legislatures ought to provide at
least some of the resources needed to
defray the costs of uncompensated
care. Finally, given what it terms the
"health care stalemate in Washington",
ACEP is somewhat pessimistic about
what the federal government can do
to alleviate EMTALA pressures. As
such, ACEP advocates a long-term view
that emphasizes a gradual evolution
towards a regime in which emergency
care is accessible and appropriately
compensated. To achieve these goals,
ACEP encourages HCFA to experi-
ment with creative alternatives to the
current EMTALA-oriented system. For
example, HCFA could oppose the
criminalization as fraud and corruption
the practice of using Medicare, Med-
icaid and similar public funds to cross-
subsidize uncompensated care. An-
other possibility is for HCFA to require
MCOs to compensate physicians who
justifiably treat MCO patients, even if
proper prior authorization was not se-
cured. Only through these sorts of
structural changes, ACEP believes, will
stability and universal accessibility be
achieved.
Conclusion
Though the Special Advisory Bulletin
clarifies how health care providers are
to comply with EMTALA, it leaves the
largest question unanswered: What are
the long-term financial implications of
an onerous and unfunded mandate?
The ACEP report contends that the
central aim of EMTALA-a minimal
universal health care benefit-is unat-
tainable so long as providers teeter pre-
cipitously on bankruptcy. As in other
areas of health care, the crux of the
EMTALA debate is how to reconcile
the statute's expansive goals with the
meager resources available for their
realization.
Jeffrey Rowes
Disability & ADA: Dis-
parate Insurance Cover-
age for Physical and
Psychological Disabilities
Does Not Violate ADA
In Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d
1092 (loth Cit. 1999), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit up-
held a U.S. District Court's grant of
summary judgment against an
employee's claim that an employer-
operated disability insurance plan,
which offered different levels of com-
pensation for disabilities due to men-
tal and physical conditions, violated
Title I of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA).1 The Court of Appeals
found that (1) the Thiokol plan
administrator's interpretations of the
plan were not arbitrary and capricious,
and that (2) the plan's different treat-
ment of disabilities caused by physical
and mental conditions did not violate
the ADA.
The Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) is a general remedial statute
designed to combat discrimination
against persons with disabilities.2 Both
private plaintiffs and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) may enforce the act.' Title I
of the ADA prohibits discrimination
against employees "because of their
disability" in the terms, conditions, and
privileges of their employment.4
Defendant Thiokol administered
a disability benefits plan for its employ-
ees. The plan compensated employ-
ees for disabilities, with no cap on the
duration of benefits for a disability
caused by a physical condition. Com-
pensation for mental disabilities was
limited to 24 months.
Plaintiff Ivan Kimber worked for
Defendant Thiokol as a heavy equip-
ment operator from the 1970s until the
secondary effect of insulin dependent
diabetes caused him to be reassigned
as a clerk, and then to leave work. The
Thiokol disability insurance plan found
that he was totally disabled by visual,
circulatory, and other sequelae of his
diabetes. Kimber's continued disabil-
ity was reviewed regularly by Thiokol's
benefits plan and John Hancock Co.,
Thiokol's external claim reviewer. In
1995, Kimber's continued disability
was questioned by John Hancock. His
benefits were terminated for failure to
provide documentation of a continu-
ing disability. Kimber submitted a re-
quest for continued benefits supported
by evidence that he continued to be
disabled by depression and possible
psychosis associated with his physical
condition. Thiokol reinstated
Kimber's disability payments, but clas-
sified his claim as based on a mental
disability, and imposed the 24 month
benefits cap.
Kimber brought suit to require the
continuation of benefits in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah.
He claimed that the decision to termi-
nate was contrary to the terms of the
Thiokol disability plan, and that the
plan's difference in coverage for physi-
cal and mental disabilities violated the
ADA. The District Court granted de-
fendant Thiokol's motion for summary
judgment. The 10t Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed de novo. Writing for
the 1 0 th Circuit's unanimous three-
judge panel, Judge Paul Kelly evaluated
and rejected Kimber's claims under the
ADA and ERISA, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act ("ERISA').5
ERISA regulates the operation of
employee benefits plans to ensure the
compliance of the plan manager with
its own rules, and to ensure that em-
ployees receive the benefits to which
they are entitled. Kimber argued that
the process and decisions by which the
plan administrator reclassified and then
terminated his benefits violated the law.
The court rejected this claim. Benefits
plan administrators' determinations of
fact and interpretations of plan terms
are evaluated under a highly deferen-
tial standard-they will not be dis-
turbed by a reviewing court unless ar-
bitrary and capricious.' Kimber argued
that Thiokol's operation of its own self-
funded plan created a conflict of inter-
est, and that the court should there-
fore review the administrator's actions
with reduced deference. The court
rejected this contention, arguing that
there was no appreciable conflict of
interest because the plan was adminis-
tered by a salaried employee, and that
disability benefits paid under the plan
only totaled 0.3% of Thiokol's annual
operating expenses.7 The court found
(1) that the administrator's reclassifi-
cation of Kimber's disability was an
appropriate exercise of the plan's con-
tinuing review provisions,8 (2) that
documents supporting Kimber's claims
were properly reviewed by a managed
care plan contractor rather than the
plan administrator herself,9 and (3) that
the facts before the administrator could
support the conclusion that the disabil-
ity was due in significant part to a men-
tal illness. 10 The administrator's de-
termination rested on her interpreta-
tion of language in the plan distinguish-
ing between disabilities "due to" physi-
cal and mental illness." She read the
term as meaning "due, in at least sig-
nificant part, to". Reviewing the
administrator's interpretation of the
plan, the court found that the phrase
"due to" was ambiguous, and that the
interpretation was a reasonable, and
therefore valid, interpretation of am-
biguous language. 12
The court then considered the
position of Kimber and, as amicus cu-
riae, the EEOC, that providing dispar-
ate benefits for physical and mental
disabilities violates the ADA. Kimber
focused on the different benefits given
by the plan to workers with different
disabilities. Relying on decisions in
similar cases from the Third", Fourth14,
Sixth", Seventh' 6 , and Eighth' 7 Cir-
cuits, the court dismissed Kimber's ar-
gument. Rather than adopting
Kimber's stance that a court's focus
should be on the disparate ex-post
treatment of disabilities, the court fo-
cused on the neutral ex-ante opportu-
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nity for plan participation offered to
employees. In other words, the court
held that instead of considering the
differences between compensation
paid to plan beneficiaries with differ-
ent disabilities, the proper question is
whether any beneficiaries with pro-
tected disabilities were discriminated
against because of their disability by
being denied the same benefits other
plan members would receive for the
same disability.
Judge Kelley noted that "[w]hile
[Thiokol's disability plan differentiated
between types of disabilities, this is a
far cry from a specified employee fac-
ing differential treatment due to her
disability...."' The court held that
"[s]o long as every employee is offered
the same plan regardless of that
employee's contemporary or future
disability status, then no discrimination
has occurred ... "11 Quoting the 7Th
circuit's decision in EEOC v. CNA In-
surance, the court added that ".... the
ADA does not mandate equality be-
tween individuals with different dis-
abilities."z20
The court also noted the potential
financial implications of requiring in-
surance companies and employee-op-
erated plans to provide benefits to per-
sons with mental disabilities at the same
level they do for those with physical
disabilities. It echoed the Third
Circuit's finding in Ford v. Schering-
Plough that if the ADA was held to re-
quire such treatment, it "...would de-
stabilize the insurance industry in a
manner definitely not intended by
Congress when passing the ADA."''2
Finally, the court relied upon the
D.C. Circuit's ruling in Modderno v.
Gng22 that distinctions in benefits based
on physical and mental disabilities had
been valid under the ADA's predeces-
sor, the Rehabilitation Act. Because of
the similar purposes and structures of
the two laws, Rehabilitation Act case
law is often used as a model for inter-
preting the ADA. 21
The Tenth Circuit's opinion was
handed down in the context of in-
creased political activity surrounding
mental health and the mentally ill.
Activists in the area have focused both
on increasing the resources available to
mentally ill persons and their families,
and upon changing the public percep-
tion of mental illness. In the first Sur-
geon General's Report on Mental Ill-
ness, Dr. David Sacher notes that
"[Mental disorders] continue too fre-
quently to be spoken of in whispers and
shame. Fortunately, leaders in the men-
tal health field-fiercely dedicated ad-
vocates, scientists, government offi-
cials, and consumers-have been insis-
tent that mental health "flow in the
mainstream of health. 21 4 HHS Secre-
tary Donna Shalala has praised Tipper
Gore's work as Mental Health Advi-
sor to the President in arguing that
"mental illnesses are just as real as other
illnesses ... "25
Had it adopted the position taken
by Kimber and the EEOC in this mat-
ter-that the ADA requires similar
treatment of physical and mental dis-
abilities-the court would have would
have provided a powerful tool to equal-
ize treatment for mental illness. It
would also have made a clear statement
of public policy that mental illness is
no less important than physical illness.
The rejection of this view by the Kimber
court and subsequently by the Ninth
Circuit in Weyer v. Twentieth Century
Fox,26 has forced advocates for equal
treatment to return to the legislative
and administrative arenas in their
search for relief.
Nicklas A. Akers
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AIDS: Mississippi Su-
preme Court Adopts
New Standard for Fear of
Exposure to AIDS
On November 4, 1999, in South Cen-
tral Regional Medical Center v.
Pickering, 1999 WL 1000703 (1999),
the Mississippi Supreme Court created
a new legal standard that allows pa-
tients to recover damages for fear of
exposure to AIDS even though they
cannot prove actual exposure. By
adopting this standard, the Mississippi
Supreme Court joined the minority of
jurisdictions seeking to encourage pro-
viders to use reasonable care when han-
dling instruments capable of transmit-
ting disease.
Factual background
Plaintiff Jimmie Pickering is a female
diabetic, who was receiving treatment
at South Central Regional Medical
Center (South Central) between Sep-
tember 30 and October 5, 1987 to
regulate her blood sugar levels.
Pickering used the hospital's Autoclix
machine, which required that Pickering
use lancets to prick her finger to draw
blood.
According to Pickering, the nurse
responsible for her treatment informed
her that the lancets with which she had
been pricking her fingers were previ-
ously used lancets. In one alleged inci-
dent, the nurse grabbed Pickering's
hand, effectively preventing her from
using a lancet. The nurse informed
Pickering that the group of lancets from
which she had chosen was a group of
previously used lancets and immedi-
ately disposed of the lancets in a proper
receptacle. When Pickering asked the
nurse why she had not disposed of the
lancets before then, the nurse allegedly
responded that the receptacle was
implemented only two weeks earlier
and that she was not yet accustomed
to using it.
Pickering further claimed that ev-
ery time she had previously tested her
blood for sugar levels, she had been
employing used lancets. However,
Pickering was unable to offer any evi-
dence that the lancets she used were
contaminated with HIV or any other
communicable diseases; the lancets
were disposed of by the hospital be-
fore they could be tested.
It is undisputed, however, that
South Central ordered Pickering to be
tested for HIV She was tested five times
between September, 1987 and Septem-
ber, 1988. Each time, the result of the
test was negative. After learning that
she was exposed to previously used lan-
cets, Pickering allegedly became ex-
tremely anxious and afraid that she had
contracted HIV Pickering and her
husband brought suit for emotional
distress.
Previous court rulings
The "actual exposure" requirement
was recently articulated in Mississippi
in Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v.
Ferguson, 662 So.2d (Miss. 1995). In
this 1995 decision, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court held that for a patient to
recover for emotional distress predi-
cated on potential future illness, "there
must be substantial proof of exposure
and medical evidence that would indi-
cate a possible future illness." Id. at 658.
In that case, the Fergusons brought suit
based on a fear of developing cancer
from dioxins released by a mill situ-
ated 100 miles away from their house.
The Ferguson's claim was rejected on
the grounds that they never tested the
water from their wells and property;
tests of dioxin levels in neighboring
areas that they presented was deemed
insufficient. The court held that "emo-
tional stress based on the fear of a fu-
ture illness must await a manifestation
of that illness or be supported by sub-
stantial exposure to the danger." Id. at
650.
A majority of jurisdictions side
with the Ferguson requirement of ac-
tual exposure when considering emo-
tional distress claims based on a fear
of contracting AIDS. For example, in
Pendergeist v. Pendergrass, 961 S.W2d
919 (1998), a patient sued a hospital
for allegedly giving him a human blood
factor instead of a synthetic blood fac-
tor which was known to be safer. The
Missouri court rejected the patient's
claim, because "he failed to offer any
evidence that the [human] blood prod-
uct was contaminated with HIV or
hepatitis B." Id. at 926.
A minority of jurisdictions main-
tains that actual exposure is not a pre-
requisite to recovering damages. The
damage amount in these cases, how-
ever, is less then the amount in the ac-
tual exposure cases. Here, courts limit
the patients' recovery for emotional
distress to a "window of anxiety," de-
fined as the period of time between
when a patient learns of possible ex-
posure to HIV and when the patient
receives definitive HIV-negative results.
Faya v. Almara, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).
South Central Regional Medical
Center v. Pickering: A new
standard is adopted.
In Pickering's case, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court declined to use the ac-
tual exposure requirement to dismiss
her claim. Notably, the court ex-
plained that it did not abandon the
actual exposure requirement. The
court held that in actual exposure cases
a patient needs only to establish: (1)
that the hospital owed a duty to the
patient to protect her from exposure
to diseases; (2) that the hospital
breached that duty by "negligently al-
lowing or causing a medically recog-
nized instrument or channel of trans-
mission to come into physical contact"
with the patient; (3) that the resulting
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emotional injury was a "foreseeable
result of that breach"; and (4) that there
was, in fact, an emotional injury. In
such cases, where the hospital "allowed
or caused the best evidence to be de-
stroyed," thereby denying the patient
an opportunity to test it, a rebuttable
presumption arises in favor of the pa-
tient in court. Thus, the hospital, not
the patient, carries the burden of prov-
ing that the instrument which came
into contact with the patient as a re-
sult of the hospital's negligence did not
carry a disease.
According to the court, the rebut-
table presumption prevents the unjust
result of punishing the patient in court
for not being able to offer substantial
proof of exposure where the source of
that substantial proof has been de-
stroyed by its source. This injustice
would not occur, the court noted, if
the hospital did not know or have rea-
son to know that the evidence which
it discarded was in question and where
it was disposed of in the normal course
of a medical practice. In such cases,
then, the court held that the presump-
tion does not arise.
Finally, the court decided that in
the absence of illness resulting from the
alleged exposure, as in this case, recov-
ery is limited to compensation for emo-
tional distress during the "window of
anxiety." For Pickering, the window
was the time period between when she
learned of her possible exposure and
when she received conclusive HIV-
negative results.
Conclusion: Some policy concerns
The issue of whether a patient is re-
quired to prove actual exposure in re-
covery for fear of contracting AIDS is
a difficult one. Indeed, courts' attempts
to resolve the issue have triggered tu-
multuous public policy debates. The
majority of jurisdictions have contin-
ued to emphasize the importance of
requiring actual exposure in order to
ensure that a claim is bona fide, while
the minority has responded by argu-
ing that the actual exposure rule does
not provide plaintiffs with compensa-
tion for legitimate grievances. 22 Am.
J. Trial Advoc. 495 (1998). With its
ruling, the Mississippi Supreme Court
supplied an additional justification
through its encouragement of hospi-
tals to use reasonable care in handling
instruments capable of transmitting
disease and to conduct tests to deter-
mine whether such instruments are
contaminated in the event that they
came into contact with an individual.
According to the courts, the burden
should fall on the providers because
they are, in the end, the greater cost-
avoider: "South Central was in the best
position to determine the capability of
the lancet to transmit the disease caus-
ing agents. A simple and relatively ex-
peditious test of the lancet would most
likely have prevented the Pickerings
from developing any substantial or rea-
sonable fears of contracting any com-
municable diseases."
Iris Lan
Organ Transplantation:
New Regulations to Alter
Distribution of Organs
On December 17, 1999, President
Clinton signed the Ticket to Work and
Work Incentives Improvement Act of
1999,1 which instituted a 90-day com-
ment period for the amended Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Net-
work ("OPTN") Final Rule ("Final
Rule"), a comprehensive set of guide-
lines that would affect how organs are
allocated throughout the country.2
Barring further legislative action, the
Final Rule, which has been over five
years in the making, will be effective
on March 16, 2000. 3
The Final Rule, issued by the De-
partment of Health and Human Ser-
vices ("DHHS") pursuant to the Na-
tional Organ Transplant Act,4 was origi-
nally published April 2, 1998.s It pro-
vided a number of substantive changes
to the process through which organs
are allocated by the United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a private,
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non-profit organization charged with
administering the national organ trans-
plantation network.6 Following a one-
year moratorium to allow comments
and review, DHHS published an
amended version of the rule on Octo-
ber 20, 1999. This version incorpo-
rated suggestions made after an exten-
sive review undertaken at Congress'
request by the National Academy of
Science's Institute of Medicine. The
rule was to go into effect on Novem-
ber 19, 1999, but was again stayed to
allow further examination as well as
scientific and medical input.
The cautious approach to the Fi-
nal Rule is understandable, as it seeks
to adjust a delicate national system of
organ allocation initiated in the 1970s.
While organ transplantation has be-
come "an established medical proce-
dure," with over 20,000 transplants
performed annually in 278 transplan-
tation centers,7 the way in which or-
gans should be allocated remains con-
troversial. The debate over the Final
Rule reflects the ideological and prac-
tical divide between DHHS and UNOS
concerning the procedure and criteria
for allocating organs, as well as the
procedure for reviewing the organ al-
location system.8 The root of their dis-
agreement appears to be how to deal
with scarcity. With only approximately
10,000 organ donors each year for
over 60,000 patients in need, policy
decisions determining who receives the
limited number of organs carry crucial
consequences.'
Under the current system, UNOS
implemented guidelines where "pa-
tients are given priority for organs
based first on their geographic location
instead of their medical need." 10 Once
an organ becomes available, the sys-
tem looks within the local geographi-
cal confine, allocating the organ to the
patient who has the greatest medical
need. This organ will normally be sent
to other regions only if no one in the
original locale can accept it. This sys-
tem reflects the current medical real-
ity: organs remain viable only for a lim-
ited amount of time prior to the trans-
plantation. Thus, it is not generally
considered feasible to transport an or-
gan great distances." With the im-
provement of medical technology,
these "cold ischemic times" (i.e., when
the organ is en route) have been ex-
tended; still, neither DHHS nor UNOS
maintain that organs currently remain
viable for enough time to establish a
true "national" list. However, despite
the impracticality of a national list,
some do criticize the system for adher-
ing to the "local first" allocation policy,
reasoning that the "geographic areas"
could be broadened. If the size of the
region is increased, they argue, those
patients in greater need could receive
organs without necessarily jeopardiz-
ing the organ's viability.2
Another criticism of the current
system is the alleged lack of uniform
criteria for "deciding when to list pa-
tients for transplantation and for iden-
tifying patients' medical urgency sta-
tus."' 3 Insofar as "waiting time" is used
as a criterion, and to the extent that an
arbitrarily-defined "medical need" al-
lows one patient to pass another on
the list, DHHS argues that the system
needs a common set of classifications
for doctors in diverse geographic ar-
eas. Otherwise, certain patients de-
scribed by their doctors "as more medi-
cally urgent than they really are" 14 will
be placed above others in equal or even
greater need. s
A third complaint is that the final
system lacks a strong, governing body
to ensure non-arbitrary decisions and
compliance with the rules. DHHS
claims that increased accountability
and review could better meet the pub-
lic interest in providing for the fair,
equitable, and effective distribution of
organs to those patients most in need.'6
While there are other alleged sys-
temic deficiencies, the perceived prob-
lems above were the primary focal
points of public scrutiny, and the main
areas where the Final Rule came un-
der attack. Relying in part on the In-
stitute of Medicine's study, DHHS
amended the original rule to address
these shortcomings. The Final Rule
requires UNOS "to develop standard-
ized criteria for listing patients and
defining their medical urgency status,"
attempting to eliminate perceived dif-
ferences in treatment based on geo-
graphic disparities. 7 This enables
UNOS, relying on the extensive and
diverse backgrounds and experiences
of its members, to determine the medi-
cal and ethical guidelines for minimiz-
ing the role of geography." The Final
Rule also mandates that organs be pro-
vided first to those patients with the
greatest need, given the ischemic re-
straints as well as other medical con-
siderations such as favoring healthier
patients over those who may be too ill
to benefit from the transplantation.' 9
Finally, inter alia, the Final Rule estab-
lishes "an independent scientific review
board" to aid the DHHS Secretary in
evaluating, overseeing, and enforcing
the organ allocation policies under the
rule and as formulated by UNOS.
While there is the expected con-
sensus that the system should be fair
and effective, disagreement appears
when deciding how to make the sys-
tem fair and effective. UNOS and
many transplant practitioners fear the
proposed rule, while well-intentioned,
will be ineffective, and furthermore,
may even cause harm. One concern is
that increasing the geographic areas
over which organs are distributed
would unduly favor large transplant
centers; if so, this trend could eventu-
ally force smaller and medium-sized
centers to close. UNOS worries that if
transplant centers close, people, lack-
ing the visible reminder of the local
transplant center, will be less likely to
donate organs, which will further ex-
acerbate the existing organ shortage.20
On a similar note, UNOS has argued
that a broader geographic list will lead
to longer waits for those patients pre-
viously in a smaller geographic area; if
organs are distributed nationally, and
one criteria for distribution is the length
of the wait, those centers with more
people (and thus most likely longer
waits) may command organs before the
smaller center patients get their turn.2'
Critics of the plan also fear that its pro-
visions will lead to the sickest patients
getting the organs, even if these organs
would be better or more efficiently
used in healthier persons with greater
chances of survival.22 Finally, some
worry that the regulation delegates too
much power to DHHS, dubiously
stripping the UNOS doctors and ex-
perts of the decision-making power
only doctors and experts should have.23
However, despite the earnest hesi-
tation, many of these fears appear un-
founded. The Final Rule grants broad
latitude to UNOS in developing the
medical standards to implement the
rule's more general goals. Where a
strict interpretation of the rule would
violate the clear intent of saving lives
with optimal efficiency, it can plausi-
bly be assumed that the DHHS would
hear UNOS concerns and approve
them where appropriate. The Final
Rule in no way suggests that sound
medical practices should be abandoned
for the sake of any "bright line" test
erroneously read into the rule. Also,
extending the geographic regions is
merely an attempt to get organs to
those most in need, instead of those
closest to the donor (when and where
medically appropriate and feasible, as
determined by UNOS). As well as pro-
viding a more equitable distribution,
this should allow smaller centers with
fewer donors to benefit, receiving or-
gans from other regions for critical
cases that would otherwise be used by
less urgent patients in the locale where
the organ was donated. On a similar
note, if organs are allocated beyond the
region where they are procured, a lo-
cal region need not produce as many
donors to ensure its patients are served.
This may benefit those regions where
health and safety regulations lead to
fewer deaths in which organ donation
is possible.
Given the dissonance, it appears
that the rift will continue until many
of these notions are tested and evalu-
ated using real empirical data. How-
ever, compromise is possible: the origi-
nal Final Rule was amended, and, in
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recent months, UNOS has adopted
"larger" geographic areas for allocat-
ing livers, as well as endorsed more
uniform national standards for evalu-
ating one's need for an organ and con-
comitant place on the wait list. In all,
despite the remaining disagreements,
it appears that the Final Rule takes a
necessary and flexible2 4 step toward a
more reasonable and equitable system
of organ allocation.
Daniel Luke Geyser
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Administration, Fact Sheet on Improving
the Nation's Organ Transplantation System
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://
www. h rs a. go v/o sp/do t/
Fact°/20Sheet.pdf> (noting that "[a]lmost
5000 patients die each year, some 13 each
day, while awaiting an organ for transplan-
tation").
1o. Id.
11. See United Network for Organ
Sharing, Justification for Equitable Organ
Allocation (visited Feb. 22, 2000) < http:/
/ ww w. u n o s. o r g/
frame Default.asp?Category=Newsroom>.
12. See, for example, Health Resources
and Services Administration, Secretary
Shalala Statement (visited Feb. 10, 2000)
<http://www. hrsa.gov/osp/dot/
Sec%20Statement.pdf> (stating that,
"[o]rgan sharing must take place over broad
enough areas to ensure that organs can
reach the patients who need them most,
and for whom transplantation is most medi-
cally appropriate"); see also Health Re-
sources and Services Administration, Fact
Sheet on Improving the Nation's Organ
Transplantation System (visited Feb. 10,
2000) <http://www.hrsa.gov/osp/dot/
Fact/o20Sheet.pdf>.
13. Health Resources and Services
Administration, Fact Sheet on Improving
the Nation's Organ Transplantation System
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://
www. h rsa. gov/osp/dot/
Fact%20Sheet.pdf>; see also United Net-
work for Organ Sharing, Justification for
Equitable Organ Allocation (visited Feb. 22,
2000) < http://www.unos.org/
frame Default.asp ?Category = Newsroom >
("At present, there are no rules governing
what the patient's condition must be in
order to be added to the list.").
14. Health Resources and Services
Administration, Fact Sheet on Improving
the Nation's Organ Transplantation System
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://
www. h rsa.gov/osp/dot/
FactO/o2OSheet.pdf>.
15. See id. It should be noted that this
does not necessarily imply doctors abuse
the system. It only suggests that, without a
uniform standard, doctors in some regions
may classify patients differently than doc-
tors in other regions. This may produce
unequal results to the extent that such clas-
sifications are then used to allocate organs.
16. See id.
17. Id. See also Health Resources and
Services Administration, HHS Rule Calls
for Organ Allocation Based on Medical
Criteria, Not Geography (visited Feb. 22,
2000) <http://www.hrsa.dhhs.gov/News-
PA/organreg.htm> (stating that "allocation
of scarce organs [should] be based on com-
mon medical criteria, not accidents of ge-
ography").
18. It should be mentioned that, while
the criteria for allocating organs differ with
each organ (e.g., certain organs require
extensive prescreening to find a positive
match with the patient; certain organs re-
main viable prior to transplant for differ-
ent periods of time), these differences are
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immaterial to the Final Rule. The regula-
tion requires UNOS to implement the stan-
dards for organ allocation, and in no way
requires the same set of criteria for each
organ; the differences will be adjusted by
UNOS under the rule.
19. See Health Resources and Services
Administration, Fact Sheet on Improving
the Nation's Organ Transplantation System
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://
www. hrs a. gov/osp/dot/
Fact%20Sheet.pdf> ("allocating organs to
most medically urgent patients does not
require transporting organs so far that or-
gan viability would be threatened, but in-
stead recognizes that medical factors limit
the transportability of organs; the final rule
does not require a single "national list" for
allocation, but rather calls on the OPTN
to develop adequately broad allocation ar-
eas to ensure best use of organs to save
lives....").
20. See United Network for Organ
Sharing, IOM Report Released (visited Feb.
22, 2000) <http://www.unos.org/
frameDefault.asp?Category=Newsroom>.
However, it is not clear why sending or-
gans to a different geographic location for
those most in need would deter potential
donors. Furthermore, if the fear is that local
transplant centers will close, thus reducing
donor visibility, public information cam-
paigns could easily reverse this decline.
21. See United Network for Organ
Sharing, Transcript of Dr. Hunsicker's Tes-
timony (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://
w w w . u n o s . o r g /
frameDefault.asp?Category =Newsroom>.
This argument questionably presupposes
that the length of the patient's wait will be
a relevant factor; it also ignores that at some
point the smaller center patients will have
waited the same amount of time as the
larger centers (especially if they are con-
tinually passed over in favor of said larger
centers).
22. See Health Resources and Services
Administration, Fact Sheet on Improving
the Nation's Organ Transplantation System
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://
www. h rsa.gov/osp/dot/
FactO/o20Sheet.pdf> (noting the views of
the Final Rule's critics).
23. See United Network for Organ
Sharing, Transcript of Dr. Hunsicker's Tes-
timony (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://
w w w . u n o s . o r g /
frameDefault.asp?Category =Newsroom >;
United Network for Organ Sharing, IOM
Report Released (visited Feb. 22, 2000)
< http://www.unos.org/
frame_Default.asp ?Category = Newsroom>
(explaining that "Congress made clear
when it passed the National Organ Trans-
plant Act 15 years ago that crucial medical
decisions about transplantation should be
made by the medical community.").
24. In addition to the broad latitude
afforded UNOS in implementing the spe-
cifics of the Final Rule's provisions, the step
can always be retraced if experience proves
the rule-makers wrong.
Internet Pharmacies:
Regulation of a Growing
Industry
Industry analysts estimate that Inter-
net pharmacies will generate $1.4 bil-
lion1 in prescription drug sales by 2001
and over $15 billion by 2004.2 The
recent rush by traditional brick and
mortar pharmacies either to partner
with existing Internet pharmacies or to
create their own web counterparts il-
lustrates the increasing importance of
business on the Internet. Last summer,
retail pharmacy giant CVS acquired the
Internet pharmacy soma.com and
changed its name to reflect the new
ownership.' Early this year, in another
key industry move, Walgreen's
launched an upgraded, full-service In-
ternet pharmacy in order to compete
more successfully in the pharmacy in-
dustry.4 It is estimated that there are
currently over 400 businesses operat-
ing on the Internet that dispense pre-
scription drugs.
As the number of Internet phar-
macies has increased, so has the con-
cern regarding the safety of prescrip-
tion drugs dispensed over the Internet.
Many of these web sites prescribe pre-
scription drugs without a valid pre-
scription, dispense drugs of question-
able quality and fail to inform patients
of possible side effects and interactions.
Additionally, customers have difficulty
knowing whether an Internet phar-
macy is a legitimate operation.
How pharmacies operate on the
Internet
Despite the large number of Internet
pharmacies, they fall primarily into
four categories': online pharmacies
that are partners with traditional brick
and mortar pharmacies (such as
drugstore.com and Rite Aid); online
pharmacies that are themselves brick
and mortar pharmacies (such as
cvs.com); online pharmacies that op-
erate solely on the Internet (such as
planetrx.com); and web sites, usually
based outside of the United States,
where consumers can order prescrip-
tion drugs without a prescription (such
as viagra-global.com).
Each of these types of pharmacies
operates differently with regard to how
a patient seeks to have a prescription
filled. All require the patient to set up
a personal account by choosing a user
name and password. This account con-
tains basic personal information such
as name, address and phone number,
primarily for the purpose of billing and
shipping. Only a few of the Internet
pharmacies require patients to com-
plete any type of health questionnaire
detailing such relevant specifics as al-
lergies, diagnosed illnesses and medi-
cal history.
Internet pharmacies offer the con-
sumer several different options in fill-
ing their prescriptions. Initially, con-
sumers can mail their prescription to
an address given on the web site. This
works the same way as mail order phar-
macies that have existed for many
years. Some pharmacies require con-
sumers to mail in their prescription, as
is the case with prescriptions for Sched-
ule I narcotics filled on cvs.com. Sec-
ond, patients can have their physician
phone, fax or mail the prescription to
the Internet pharmacy, just as they
would with their traditional neighbor-
hood pharmacy. Third, patients can
enter their prescription information
directly into the web site themselves.
Depending on the particular Internet
pharmacy, the web site may contact the
physician to verify the prescription in
every case or only on an as-determined
basis. Fourth, patients can transfer
existing prescriptions to Internet phar-
macies by directing their current phar-
macy to do so or by providing the rel-
evant information to the web site,
which will then contact the pharmacy.
Fifth, each Internet pharmacy allows
consumers to obtain refills of prescrip-
tions they have had previously filled
on the web. This requires the con-
sumer to log in to their personal ac-
count and complete a simple form.
Finally, in the case of most internation-
ally-based web sites, the consumer sim-
ply completes an order form and se-
lects the desired drug and quantity.6
After the consumer transmits his
or her prescription to the Internet phar-
macy using one of these methods, the
web site then ships the prescription
directly to the patient. Consumers who
use an Internet pharmacy with a brick
and mortar counterpart, such as
drugstore.com or cvs.com, can opt to
pick up their prescription at their
neighborhood pharmacy instead of
having it shipped. It usually takes one
to five business days to receive a pre-
scription, depending on the shipping
option selected by the consumer. In
the case of internationally-based Inter-
net pharmacies, it can take up to three
weeks for delivery.
Obviously the quality and effec-
tiveness of the pharmacy varies quite
substantially from web site to web site.
Serious concern exists about the qual-
ity of the drugs dispensed over the In-
ternet. Consumers face possible ad-
verse side effects, potentially danger-
ous interactions, as well as harm from
contaminated, counterfeit or expired
drugs. This has resulted in the call from
consumer groups, the government and
others for regulation of the burgeon-
ing industry.
Regulation of Internet pharmacies
The states have traditionally regulated
pharmacies and the dispensing of pre-
scription drugs. State boards of phar-
macy license both pharmacies and
pharmacists to practice in their state.
The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has traditionally regulated only
the drugs themselves, approving them
for use to treat various illnesses or con-
ditions and ensuring their safety. In-
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creasing growth of the Internet phar-
macy industry as well as growing con-
cern about the safety of drugs dispensed
over the Internet has prompted the
pharmacy industry, the federal govern-
ment and several states to take action.
Industry self-regulation
The primary industry response to In-
ternet pharmacy growth has come
from two sources, the National Asso-
ciation of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP)
and a newly formed broad-based coa-
lition. The NABP was established in
1904 to "assist state licensing boards
in developing, implementing, and en-
forcing uniform standards to protect
the Public Health."'7 In the spring of
1999, the NABP established the Veri-
fied Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites
(VIPPS) program in response to in-
creasing public concern about the
safety of Internet pharmacies.
The VIPPS program establishes a
"Good Housekeeping" type seal of
approval that Internet pharmacies can
display on their home pages. The seal
provides a direct link to the NABP In
order to receive the seal "a pharmacy
must comply with the licensing and
inspection requirements of their state
and each state to which they dispense
pharmaceuticals. In addition, pharma-
cies displaying the VIPPS seal have
demonstrated to NABP compliance
with VIPPS criteria including patient
rights to privacy, authentication and
security of prescription orders, adher-
ence to a recognized quality assurance
policy, and provision of meaningful
consultation between patients and
pharmacists."8
To date, the NABP has certified
four Internet pharmacies: cvs.com,
drugstore.com, merck-medco.com and
planetrx.com. As many as thirty addi-
tional Internet pharmacies have applied
for VIPPS certification. It remains to
be seen what effect this will have on
the overall safety of drugs prescribed
over the Internet.
A new pharmacy industry coali-
tion formed in 1999 in response to the
chaos created by the rapid growth of
pharmacies on the Internet. The coa-
lition resulted from an Internet phar-
macy summit held in Washington, D.C.
on November 9, 1999. The National
Association of Boards of Pharmacy
organized the summit after Bill
Razzouk, CEO of planetrx.com, made
a request for one during his testimony
before the House Commerce Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations
on July 30, 1999.2 Members of the
coalition come from federal and state
governments, consumer organizations,
medical groups and Internet pharma-
cies.' 0
The coalition has formulated four
primary goals: first, to form a task
force on technology to develop legis-
lative and enforcement initiatives; sec-
ond, to develop an aggressive con-
sumer education plan; third, to create
Operation Safe Net in order to orga-
nize the industry and serve as an agency
to receive consumer complaints; and
fourth, to establish the proper relation-
ships for patients and pharmacists at
Internet pharmacies." It is currently
unclear how the coalition's goals will
interact with recent actions taken by
state and federal governments.
Federal government regulation
The first action by the federal govern-
ment came in July, 1999, when the
FDA added information to its web site
(fda.gov) in order to assist consumers
in safely purchasing drugs over the In-
ternet. The web site answers consumer
questions such as: "Is it safe to buy
prescription or over-the-counter drugs
online? How can you tell if a Website
that sells medical products is legiti-
mate? What should you do before you
buy medical products online?' 2 Ac-
cording to FDA Commissioner Jane
Henney, "[t]he development of the In-
ternet has opened up many new op-
tions for consumers to purchase prod-
ucts more conveniently" but has also
"provided unscrupulous individuals
with immense new opportunities to
promote and sell prescription drugs
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unlawfully to unsuspecting patients."13
In order to deal with the growth
of internationally-based Internet phar-
macies illegally selling prescription
drugs, the FDA has begun to issue
"cyber" warning letters transmitted
electronically to web sites the FDA has
identified as selling prescriptions that
may be illegal. The letters inform the
web site owners that they may be in
violation of U.S. laws that govern the
sales of prescription drugs and further
warn that United States Customs offi-
cials may detain and refuse entry to
future shipments from the web site. So
far one such web site has voluntarily
agreed to cease its illegal activities. 4
On December 28, 1999, President
Clinton escalated the response of the
federal government and announced a
program to protect patients who pur-
chase prescription drugs over the In-
ternet. The plan, accompanied by $10
million in new funds, would give the
FDA authority to investigate, identify
and prosecute web sites selling unap-
proved new drugs, counterfeit drugs,
or prescription drugs without a valid
prescription or those which fraudu-
lently market drugs." The plan would
also certify all Internet pharmacies that
meet state and federal requirements,
much as the NABP's VIPPS program
already does. It also creates new civil
monetary penalties and gives the FDA
subpoena authority to build cases
against offenders, a power it now
lacks. 16 This proposal met with gener-
ally favorable but mixed reaction.
While some Internet pharmacies,
including drugstore.com,
familymeds.com and
healthcentral.com, welcome the pro-
posal as a way to deal with "rogue"
web sites, the National Association of
Chain Drug Stores favors a more vol-
untary approach to regulation.17 Some
question also exists regarding the ap-
propriateness of the FDA as the regu-
lator of Internet pharmacies. Pharmacy
regulation has traditionally been the
prerogative of state boards of phar-
macy and the FDA has no previous
experience regulating in this area.
Additionally, Congressman Tho-
mas Bliley, Jr. (R-VA), Chairman of the
House Commerce Committee, criti-
cized the President's plan to expand
FDA authority.18 His committee would
have to approve any legislation ex-
panding the authority of the FDA to
include Internet pharmacies. Bliley is
reluctant to have the federal govern-
ment regulate an area traditionally con-
trolled by the states. He is also hesi-
tant to regulate the Internet when poli-
ticians in Washington, D.C. do not fully
understand its potential. 9
The United States Customs Service
also plays a role in the regulation of
Internet pharmacies. An increasingly
high number of illegal drugs enter the
United States via shipments from in-
ternationally-based online drugstores.
The U. S. Customs Service seized 4.5
times as many packages of prescription
drugs in 1999 as it did the year before.20
While some of the seized drugs had not
received approval for use in the United
States, most did not comply with FDA
labeling requirements or fell below fed-
eral quality standards.2'
Consumers are purchasing increas-
ing amounts of prescription drugs from
these international Internet pharmacies
because they offer much lower prices
than pharmacies in the United States.
For instance, drugquest.com advertises
that it offers customers prescription
drugs without a prescription at prices
of up to 60% less than the prices
charged in the United States. The re-
ality of this claim varies greatly depend-
ing on the cost to the consumer in the
United States as well as the availability
and price offered by the foreign phar-
macies through drugquest.com.22 The
high cost of prescription drugs in the
United States has prompted many in-
dividuals, especially those with chronic
illnesses who take multiple medications
on a daily basis, to seek alternate
sources for their medication.
State government regulation
States have also begun to regulate In-
ternet pharmacies. Several state attor-
neys general, including those in Mis-
souri, Michigan, Kansas and Illinois,
have taken legal action to prevent In-
ternet pharmacies from filling prescrip-
tions for citizens of their states. 23 Gen-
erally, the states allege that Internet
pharmacies have failed to register with
the appropriate authorities in order to
lawfully conduct business in their state
and fill prescriptions authored by phy-
sicians not licensed to practice medi-
cine in their state. Some web sites have
voluntarily agreed not to sell prescrip-
tion drugs to residents of certain states
after receiving warning letters.24 Ad-
ditionally, some state boards of phar-
macy have issued reprimands to unli-
censed Internet pharmacies. 21
The Attorney General of Missouri,
Jeremiah "Jay" Nixon, successfully
obtained a permanent injunction
against pillbox.com, a Texas-based In-
ternet pharmacy, preventing the com-
pany from selling prescription drugs to
Missouri residents. Pillbox.com sold
prescription drugs to Missouri custom-
ers without a state license. The injunc-
tion requires the defendants to pay a
fine of $15,000 to the state and reim-
burse all Missouri residents who pur-
chased drugs on the site. Additionally,
pillbox.com must clearly display a no-
tice on their web site indicating that
they cannot sell drugs to residents of
Missouri. Similar lawsuits have been
filed in Illinois by Attorney General Jim
Ryan against expressrx.net,
expresstoday.com, mdhealthline.com,
rxclinic.com and maleclinic.com. 26
These Internet pharmacies face up to
a $50,000 penalty for each violation
of the state's consumer fraud act.
In Michigan, Attorney General
Jennifer Granholm's office conducted
an investigation in which law enforce-
ment officials posed as customers and
purchased prescriptions drugs, includ-
ing controlled substances, online with-
out a prescription. In some cases, the
officials posed as minors and people
with illnesses who would suffer dan-
gerous side effects from the medica-
tion they obtained. As a result of the
investigation, the State of Michigan
initiated legal action against ten online
pharmacies. All of them agreed to stop
selling prescription drugs to Michigan
residents. 2
7
Future of Internet pharmacy
regulation
With the large number of Internet phar-
macies in operation and an increasingly
high number that illegally dispense pre-
scription drugs, further action to regu-
late the industry seems certain. The
jurisdictional lines, however, are far
from clear. While the states have tra-
ditionally regulated pharmacies and the
dispensing of prescription drugs, the
federal government and the FDA have
justified concerns due to the global
nature of the Internet and the threats
to public health and safety. The phar-
macy industry also has concerns about
how Internet pharmacies operate. Al-
though the industry has adopted vol-
untary standards that may work for
legitimate businesses, self-regulation
will likely prove inadequate to control
illegal practices. Because Internet phar-
macies are not confined to one particu-
lar jurisdiction, cooperation between
the states and federal government will
be required to effectively regulate the
industry and protect consumers. While
this cooperation may lead to the suc-
cessful regulation of Internet pharma-
cies that operate from within the
United States, effective regulation of
foreign-based pharmacies seems both
difficult and unlikely.
Amy J. Oliver
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e letcher Allen Health Care, Vermont's leading academic medical
nter, offers exceptional professional opportunities throughout
the health care field. As the site of the nation's first Level I Trauma
Center for adult and pediatric patients, FAHC has a solid reputation
for innovation. FAHC, in conjunction with the University of Vermont,
combines health care services and programs with teaching and
research to foster a professional environment that stresses growth and
professional challenge.
Director of Ethics
Fletcher Allen Health Care seeks outstanding candidates for the posi-
tion of Director of Ethics. The Director will serve as the ethics con-
sultant to address clinical and organizational ethics issues which can
be requested by patients, family, healthcare providers and administra-
tors regarding conflicts in areas such as values, cultural beliefs, quali-
ty of life, advance directives. It is expected that the individual select-
ed will build a strong ethics program while working with a diverse
staff population. Possible faculty appointment at the University of
Vermont College of Medicine for qualified candidate. Candidates
should have significant experience in the field of clinical and organi-
zational ethics, including consulting, education and research experi-
ence. Doctorally trained in ethics.
"Outside Magazine" and
"Life in America's States" ranked
Burlington, VT as one of the best places
to live--anywhere! Come join our staff
of healthcare professionals!
FAHC offers a competitive salary and an excellent benefits package. Qualified can-
didates, please submit scannable resume and cover letter on white paper using
basic fonts and no bold, italicized or underlined print to: Human Resources, FAHC
Ill Colchester Avenue, Burlington, VT 05401 or e-mail to: fahcjobs@vtmednet.org
(no attachments please) or use on-line resume builder at www.fahc.org. EOE.
Fletcher
Allen
HEALTHCARE
In alliance with
The University of Vermont www.fahc.org
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
PHYSICIAN-SCHOLAR IN ETHICS EDUCATION
The University of Michigan Medical School is seeking a physician-
investigator for a tenure track position in a clinical Department at the
Assistant or Associate Professor level with a focus on ethics education.
The successful candidate will have formal training and/or substantial experience in bioethics
and demonstrated skill in education and education research. Duties will include curricular
design, revision, implementation and evaluation at the graduate, post-graduate and
continuing medical education level, in collaboration with existing faculty.
The University of Michigan Medical School has prominent and committed scholars in
bioethics, medical education and medical humanities, and is a premier research institution
and tertiary care medical center. There are over 650 medical students and 800 residents
educated yearly by the more than 1000 full time Medical School faculty. The University
of Michigan Medical School is an equal opportunity employer.
For a position description or further information, contact:
Susan D. Goold, MD
3116 Taubman Center
1500 E. Medical Center Dr.
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-0376
University of Michigan Medical School:
The Program in Society and Medicine:
Phone: 734 / 936-5222
Fax: 734 / 936-8944
e-mail: sgoold@umich.edu
http://www.med.umich.edu/medschool/
http://www.mecLumich.edu/psm/psm.html
Bioethics
Symposium
Charleston, SC
The Medical University of South Carolina
and the Institute of Human Values in
Health Care announce plans for the Sev-
enth Annual Thomas A. Pitts Memorial
Lectureship in Medical Ethics: 'Power Over
Information, Power to Decide: Autonomy
and Paternalism in Health Care,' Septem-
ber 15-16, 2000. The outstanding taculty
will explore and debate issues surround-
ing locus of control of medical informa-
tion and decision-making in the context
of contemporary technology: Ronald
Bailey; H. Tristram Engelhardt, Ph.D.,
M.D.; Lawrence 0. Gostin J.D.; Sherman
A. James, Ph.D.; Karen Labacqz, Ph.D.;
David J. Rothman, Ph.D.; Alfred I. Tauber,
M.D. and Beverly Woodward, Ph.D. Infor-
mation: Robert M. Sade, M.D. or Jason F
Arnold, J.D., M.P.H. at (843) 792-5278.
Register Online at (www.values.musc-edu.)
Registration Deadline: TU SC
September 8, 2000 _ _ __
MEDICAL UNIVERSITY
E-mail: OF SOUTH CAROLINA
values@musc.edu
Institute of Human Values in Health Care
96 Jonathan Lucas St., STE 409 -Charleston, SC 29425
Visiting Faculty Scholars
Boston University
School of Public Health
The Health Law Department of
the Boston University School of
Public Health invites applications for
Visiting Faculty Scholars to spend
sabbatical time. Scholars may spend
variable amounts of time on
independent projects, and will
participate fully in on-going
seminars, conferences, courses,
clinical consultation and research.
Primary areas of interest to the
Department are: Patient Rights,
Managed Care, Genetics, Children,
Repro-duction, Human Experimen-
tation, Public Health Law and Ethics,
Human Rights & Health.
Applications are considered on a
revolving basis. For more
information, contact Michael Grodin
or George Annas, Health Law
Department, Boston University
School of Public Health, 715 Albany
St, Boston, MA 02118. Tel.
(617)638-4626; fax (617) 414-1464;
or email: <grodin@bu.edu>.
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics
The World Association for Medical Law
will hold its 13th World Congress on Medi-
cal Law, August 6-10, 2000 at the Marina
Congress Center, Helsinki, Finland. Main
topics of the scientific programme are:
1. Quality of and priorities in health care:
ethics, law and policy
• Quality of health care
" Clinical practice guidelines
2. Status and rights of patients
" Autonomy of patients and informed consent
" Medical records and right to privacy
" Gender issues in ethics and health law
" Special dilemmas related to vulnerable groups
3. Health care personnel
" Status and duties of health care personnel
" Confidentiality and conflicting duties
" Issues in nursing care
" Education in health care ethics and law
4. Liability, enforcement, forensic medicine
- Medical negligence and injury litigation
- Third party (e.g., insurance) responsibility and
liability in health care
- Risk management
5. Forensic medicine and psychiatry
" Role of forensic experts in court proceedings
" Psychiatric criminal offenders
" Forensic investigations in tracing serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law
6. Biomedicir.e and human rights
" Biomedical research involving human beings
" Genetic testing, gene therapy, cloning
" Drugs and medical devices
" Declarations on medicine and human rights
7. Human dignity; beginning & end of life
" Medically assisted suicide
" Research on human embryos and fetuses
" Living will and other advance directives
-Transplantation and definition of death
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SPEAKERS --
Pieter Admiraal, M.D.
Charles Baron, J.D.
Justice Carlos Gavirla
Derek Humphry
Justice Gerald Kogan
Helga Kuhse, Ph.D.
Barbara Coombs Lee
Charles McKhann M.D.
Alan Meisel, J.D.
Philip Nitschke, M.D.
Betty Rollin
Kathryn Tucker, J.D.
...and many more,
including family members
HEAR ABOUT --
Assisted Dying in
-Oregon
-The Netherlands
-Switzerland
-Colombia
PLUS --
The first-ever Right-
to-Die Film Festival
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800-247-7421
world@hemlock.org
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF LAW,
MEDICINE & ETHICS
21st Annual Health Law Teachers Conference
Date: June 8-10, 2000
Location: Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland,
Chair: Maxwell Mehiman, JD
* ASLME's Annual Meeting: Legal Challenges in
Genetics and Reproductive Health
Date: September 14-16, 2000
Location:
Chair:
Ohio
Cambridge, MA
Philip Reilly, MD, JD
* End-of-Life Decision Making: What Have We Learned
Since Cruzan? (with Midwest Bioethics Center)
Date: November 17-18, 2000
Location: Kansas City, MO
Chair: M.C. Sullivan, RN, JD
You can now register for ASLME conferences on-line. Please visit us at <aslme.org>. The site is secure and you can
use your MasterCard or Visa with confidence. Also on the site are audio, text, and video excerpts from past confer-
ences. For members of the Society, the full text of articles from the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics and the
American Journal of Law & Medicine is also available for reading.
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